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WINDSOR, SURROGACY, AND RACE 
Khiara M. Bridges* 
Abstract: Scholars and activists interested in racial justice have long been opposed to 
surrogacy arrangements, wherein a couple commissions a woman to become pregnant, give 
birth to a baby, and surrender the baby to the couple to raise as its own. Their fear has been 
that surrogacy arrangements will magnify racial inequalities inasmuch as wealthy white 
people will look to poor women of color to carry and give birth to the white babies that the 
couples covet. However, perhaps critical thinkers about race should reconsider their 
contempt for surrogacy following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Windsor. In the decision, the Court envisions same-sex couples and the families that they 
head as valuable threads in the fabric of American society. Surrogacy arrangements are 
vehicles for same-sex couples to produce the families that Windsor celebrates. This fact may 
encourage opponents of surrogacy arrangements who have been concerned about the racial 
implications of the practice to reconsider their opposition. This Article conducts that 
reconsideration, ultimately concluding that while surrogacy arrangements are beneficial 
because they enable persons who are unprivileged by virtue of sexual orientation to have 
children, they may reaffirm extant racial hierarchies and exacerbate the marginalization of 
persons and families that are already unprivileged by virtue of race and class. However, 
instead of calling for a ban on surrogacy for these reasons, the Article argues that there are 
more desirable avenues for destabilizing racial hierarchies and undoing the marginalization 
of unprivileged persons and families. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and activists interested in racial justice have long been 
skeptical of surrogacy arrangements, wherein a couple commissions a 
woman to become pregnant, give birth to a baby, and surrender the baby 
to the couple to raise as its own. Rarely have critical thinkers about race 
approached surrogacy as merely a technological marvel—a remarkable 
feat of science that enables infertile couples to bring the children that 
they so very much desire into the world. Instead, many scholars and 
activists who have devoted their time and energies to fighting for racial 
justice have conceptualized surrogacy as a frightening prospect, 
something that should be left to pages of science fiction lest it bring 
nightmarish racial horrors to real life. The question that sociologist 
Barbara Katz Rothman asks about surrogacy reflects the sentiment—the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University. Thanks to 
Mike Garry and Aaron Horth for tremendous research assistance. All errors remain my own. 
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thinly-veiled fear and loathing—that many critical thinkers about race 
have had about the practice: “Can we look forward to baby farms, with 
white embryos grown in young and poor Third-World mothers?”1 This 
possibility has led many persons who are interested in racial justice to 
argue that surrogacy ought to be prohibited. 
But, perhaps critical thinkers about race should reconsider their 
contempt for surrogacy in light of recent shifts in society. The most 
significant shift that might merit a reconsideration of surrogacy is the 
increasing recognition and legitimation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) persons and the families that they have created and 
desire to create. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Windsor2 is remarkable for its inclusive vision: The Court envisions 
same-sex couples, and the families that they head, as valuable threads in 
the fabric of American society. This country is a diverse one, and 
Windsor declares that same-sex couples and the families they create 
make wonderful, legitimate, respected contributions to the diversity of 
family forms present in the nation. 
Surrogacy arrangements are vehicles for same-sex couples to produce 
the families that Windsor applauds. Thus, when critical thinkers about 
race condemn surrogacy, they condemn a means through which same-
sex couples can produce the families that Windsor celebrates. This fact 
may encourage opponents of surrogacy arrangements who have been 
concerned about the racial implications of the practice to reconsider their 
opposition. 
This Article conducts that reconsideration. Part I discusses Windsor 
and its concern for the children that same-sex couples parent, noting that 
part of the reason why the Court strikes down the federal government’s 
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages is because of the harm that the 
refusal will inflict on the children of same-sex couples. Part II discusses 
the myriad reasons why critics who wrote about surrogacy in the late 
1980s to mid-1990s opposed surrogacy arrangements, paying special 
attention to these first generation fears that surrogacy arrangements 
would magnify racial inequalities inasmuch as critics predicted that 
wealthy white people would look to poor women of color to carry and 
give birth to the white babies that the couples covet. Part II goes on to 
discuss the fact that these fears about white couples commissioning poor 
women of color to act as surrogates did not materialize—at least, they 
1. Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life, in 
EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
95, 100 (Elaine Hoffman Baruch, Amadeo F. D’Adamo, Jr., & Joni Seager eds., 1988). 
2. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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did not materialize insofar as poor, U.S.-born women of color have not 
been widely commissioned to act as surrogates. This Article 
conceptualizes this fact—white couples’ failure to look to U.S.-born 
women of color for surrogacy services—as a racial implication of 
surrogacy that is a second generation concern. Moreover, it is a concern 
that may move those who are interested in racial justice to continue to 
oppose surrogacy arrangements. Part III then asks whether the disturbing 
racial implications of surrogacy are muted when same-sex couples 
commission the birth of babies. This part ultimately concludes that while 
surrogacy arrangements are beneficial because they enable persons who 
are unprivileged by virtue of sexual orientation to have children, they 
may reaffirm extant racial hierarchies and exacerbate the marginalization 
of persons and families that are already unprivileged by virtue of race 
and class. However, instead of calling for a ban on surrogacy for these 
reasons, this Article concludes that there are more desirable avenues for 
destabilizing racial hierarchies and undoing the marginalization of 
unprivileged persons and families. These avenues are more desirable 
because they do not involve limiting opportunities for LGBT persons, 
but rather expanding opportunities for poor people of color of all sexual 
orientations and gender identities. 
I. THE SPIRIT OF WINDSOR 
In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down section 
three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which defined 
marriage within federal law as only involving a man and a woman3—
despite the fact that an increasing number of states had passed laws that 
permit individuals of the same sex to marry.4 Many aspects of DOMA 
disquieted the five-Justice majority in Windsor. Justice Kennedy, who 
authored the majority opinion, noted that, in addition to the equal 
protection questions that the provision raised, there were disconcerting 
federalism5 and due process6 concerns, as well. Nevertheless, it appears 
3. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), 
invalidated by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. Section 3 provided: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 
Id. 
4. Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 257, 258 (2013). 
5. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from the[] 
history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.”). Indeed, the Court found it quite 
significant that the regulation of marriage was a function that had traditionally been left to the states. 
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that the Court took the equal protection route: it seems that, after finding 
the law motivated by animus7 and, accordingly, that it did not pursue 
any legitimate governmental interest,8 the Court ultimately struck down 
the law as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.9 
Despite the ambiguities about the basis for the Court’s holding, it is 
apparent that the Court’s decision was partially motivated by a concern 
See id. at 2691 (noting that the “‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been 
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States’” (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404, 
95 S. Ct. 553 (1975))); id. at 2680 (“The significance of state responsibilities for the definition and 
regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for when the Constitution was adopted the 
common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child 
were matters reserved to the States.”). Yet, with DOMA, the federal government usurped this 
function in order to limit the definition of marriage to those that only involve a man and a woman.  
6. See id. at 2692 (noting that DOMA required the Court to “address whether the resulting 
injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment”); id. at 2695 (noting that DOMA denied “the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment”).  
Of course, the Court’s references to “liberty” and the Due Process Clause may have nothing to do 
with due process, as such. The references may be due to the fact that the Fifth Amendment does not 
contain an Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Accordingly, all federal equal 
protection cases are due process cases to the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause has to be reverse-incorporated through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). However, the majority suggests that 
there is more to its references to the Due Process Clause than the simple doctrine of reverse 
incorporation:  
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains 
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of 
the laws. While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the 
power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection 
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right 
all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Here, the Court appears to imply 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause would prohibit DOMA independent of the equal 
protection constraints that have been reverse-incorporated into them. Whatever the Court had in 
mind, it certainly could have been clearer about the basis for its decision. See Neomi Rao, The 
Trouble with Dignity and Rights of Recognition, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2013) (discussing 
“the muddled nature of the majority opinion”). And, indeed, Justice Scalia looks to this very 
passage as evidence of the unprincipled nature of the majority’s decision. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2705–06. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the above-cited language, asking “what can that mean?” 
(emphasis in original), and concluding that the Court’s opinion “is a confusing one”). 
7. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (noting that the “principal purpose and the necessary effect of 
this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage”); id. at 2693 (“DOMA 
seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect.”). 
8. Id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose 
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”). 
9. See Peter Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal Protection, and the Classification-Framing Quandary, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 330 (2014) (arguing that Windsor is an equal protection case “with some 
substantive due process and federalism principles thrown in”).   
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for the children being raised by same-sex couples. Justice Kennedy uses 
powerful language to describe the harms that DOMA inflicts on the 
children of individuals whose marriages the federal government refuses 
to recognize. He notes that, not only does DOMA demean the 
individuals who are lawfully wedded under state law, but it also 
“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex 
couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the 
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family 
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.”10 
Thus, Windsor expresses a sincere worry about the children of same-
sex couples.11 The Court recognizes that, because of DOMA’s purpose 
and effect of disparaging their parents’ relationships, these children will 
suffer harms. Moreover, the Court’s recognition of these harms is not 
begrudging in the least. Indeed, the majority’s decision is remarkable for 
its complete willingness to take the perspective of children being raised 
by two parents of the same-sex and its complete willingness to imagine 
10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
11. Other moments in the majority opinion evince the majority’s concern about children. See id. 
at 2689 (noting that states began to recognize same-sex marriages when they acknowledged “the 
urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another 
before their children, their family, their friends, and their community” (emphasis added)); id. at 
2695 (noting that DOMA can cause children of same-sex couples financial harm due to its effect on 
tax and social security laws). Some commentators have cautioned against too much celebration of 
Windsor’s concern about children because of the work that the decision does to construct some 
parents as noble and worthy and other parents as dishonorable and deviant. For one, Melissa Murray 
observes that, like the Court in Windsor, lower courts recognizing same-sex marriages and other 
advocates for marriage equality have argued that refusing to allow persons of the same-sex to marry 
inflicts the injury of illegitimacy on these individuals’ children. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New 
About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 398, 419–21 (2012) (citing 
several instances in which courts and advocates have argued that same-sex marriages ought to be 
recognized in order to spare the children of such unions the status of illegitimacy). These courts and 
commentators argue that the children of same-sex couples that reside in jurisdictions that do not 
recognize same-sex marriages are being coerced into their status as illegitimate because their 
parents seek a legal marriage, yet the jurisdictions in which they reside deny them that ability. Id. at 
421 (“[I]llegitimacy is something that is thrust upon them and their children against their will. And 
it is the lack of choice—the absence of volition—that rankles. Implicit in the argument is a sense 
that if same-sex couples raising children could marry, they would. They would not hobble their 
children with the taint of illegitimacy.” (emphasis in original)). Murray argues that the children of 
same-sex couples who wish to marry are implicitly compared to children being parented by 
individuals who do not seek a legal marriage. Id. (“For those who can marry legally, but choose not 
to do so, the burdens of illegitimacy—for themselves and their children—are the (deserved) costs of 
that (irrational) choice.”). These latter parents, who have “willfully depart[ed] from the marital 
model and [have borne] and raise[d] children out of wedlock are, by comparison, imperfect and 
deviant.” Id. at 423. 
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the shame and sense of illegitimacy that DOMA could make them feel.12 
Windsor’s defense of families headed by same-sex parents functions 
to declare that these families are more than “acceptable”—more than 
something that an enlightened society should merely tolerate. Instead, 
the decision asserts, albeit implicitly, that families headed by individuals 
of the same-sex are a welcome and wanted feature of contemporary life 
in the United States—adding to the diversity of family forms found in a 
country that, historically, has proclaimed pride in its diversity. If this is 
the spirit of Windsor, then the decision may call into question laws that 
function to frustrate the formation of those nontraditional families that 
the Court’s decision welcomes into the body politic. 
So, the question becomes: How will the children that the Court 
worries about in Windsor come to be? That is, how will the individuals 
involved in same-sex marriages become parents of the children that 
influence the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution in Windsor? The 
question is an important one: If Windsor implicitly declares the 
legitimacy of families headed by individuals of the same sex, then it may 
also implicitly declare the illegitimacy of laws that frustrate the 
formation of those families. 
The families contemplated in Windsor can form in a multiplicity of 
ways. Parents can bring children from previous, heterosexual 
relationships into a subsequent same-sex marriage. Same-sex couples 
can also formally adopt genetically unrelated children, or they can 
informally care for children of family members, friends, or other 
members of their communities. Also, same-sex couples can turn to 
assisted reproductive technologies and produce children to whom at least 
one parent is biologically related. One of the members of a female 
couple can become pregnant through artificial insemination and raise the 
child to whom she gives birth together with her partner. And a male 
couple can seek to create a family through commissioning a surrogate to 
give birth to a child (possibly biologically related to one of the men) 
whom the couple will ultimately parent. Moreover, couples can pursue 
two avenues with respect to surrogacy. The first is traditional surrogacy, 
in which a surrogate is inseminated with donor sperm; the child to whom 
she gives birth and whom she eventually surrenders for adoption is 
genetically related to her. The second is gestational surrogacy, in which 
a fertilized ovum is implanted into a surrogate; the child to whom she 
12. See Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The 
Inevitability of Marriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17, 54–56 (2014) 
(observing that the Windsor majority recognized “the real and stigmatizing harms to children caused 
by DOMA”). 
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gives birth and whom she later relinquishes to the intended parents is 
genetically unrelated to her. 
Again, to the extent that Windsor celebrates diverse family forms and, 
accordingly, calls into question laws that frustrate the formation of these 
diverse family forms, a wide range of laws rest on shaky legal ground. 
These include child protection laws and policies that do not recognize 
the legitimacy of families headed by individuals of the same-sex; laws 
and policies that make it difficult for individuals involved in same-sex 
marriages to adopt or to foster children formally; laws and policies that 
make it difficult for lesbians to become pregnant through artificial 
insemination; and laws that prohibit the enforceability of surrogacy 
contracts. This Article will focus on the last. 
II. THE RACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGACY 
States take a variety of approaches to the regulation of surrogacy 
contracts. About half of the states do not have statutes that explicitly 
regulate surrogacy arrangements, leaving their permissibility to be 
worked out by the courts.13 Some courts have upheld surrogacy 
contracts;14 others have struck them down.15 Of those states that have 
statutes that speak directly to the permissibility of surrogacy contracts, 
six jurisdictions outlaw them outright, making all surrogacy contracts 
void and unenforceable.16 Other states take a more nuanced approach to 
the issue, regulating surrogacy based on the type of surrogacy involved 
and the features of the arrangement. For example, some prohibit 
traditional surrogacy while allowing gestational surrogacy.17 Some 
prohibit compensated surrogacy while allowing uncompensated 
surrogacy.18 Some make other requirements of the parties to the 
contract, e.g., the surrogate must have given birth to a child in the past,19 
13. See COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:2 (2013–2014 ed. 2013) (noting that only “[a]bout 
half of the states have statutes specifically addressing the permissibility of at least some forms of 
surrogacy”). 
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993). 
15. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988). 
16. See JOSLIN, MINTER, & SAKIMURA, supra note 13, at § 4.2 (Arizona, the District of 
Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, New York, and North Dakota). 
17. See id. (California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, Texas, and Utah).  
18. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2012) (“No person, organization, or agency shall 
enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage 
contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.”). 
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-806(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through ch. 428 of 2014 
legislation); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47 / 20(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-972, with 
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the parents who will ultimately have custody of the child (that is, the 
intended parents) must be married,20 or the child must be genetically 
related to one of the intended parents.21 
The patchwork of state laws that take quite different approaches to the 
regulation of surrogacy demonstrates the wide breadth of reactions that 
people have had to the practice. Some have welcomed surrogacy as an 
unqualified boon to society, conceptualizing it as a desirable technique 
that allows individuals to have genetically related children that they 
otherwise would not be able to have.22 Others have been less sanguine 
about it, discomforted by the specter of “baby-selling” that the practice 
generates.23 Others have been disturbed by the gendered dimensions of 
the practice; approaching it through a feminist lens, they have seen it not 
as a technique whereby individuals can have genetically related children, 
but rather as a technique whereby men can have genetically related 
children.24 Through this lens, women figure in surrogacy as no more 
than commoditized vessels through which men can propagate their 
genes.25 
Other critics have seen surrogacy as akin to prostitution, organ-
selling, and other practices that involve the commoditization of aspects 
of life that they argue never ought to be commoditized.26 Relatedly, 
the exception of P.A. 98-944, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756(b)(5) 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 3d Called Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(f) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.). 
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 160.754(b).  
21. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(5); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. & Special Sess.).  
22. Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a 
Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 116 (1997) 
(“Surrogacy is a viable alternative reproductive method that allows other women to assist infertile 
women . . . [in] the birth of a truly wanted child.”). 
23. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in SURROGATE 
MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 43, 49 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990). 
24. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 241 (1995) (Surrogacy 
“allow[s] a man to be a genetic father rather than enabling a woman to become a mother.”); Kerian, 
supra note 22, at 160 (“Radical feminists believe surrogacy exploits women because ‘men control 
the rules, the courts and women’s bodies.’” (quoting Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Perspectives and 
Gestational Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND 
THE LAW 55, 76 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995)). 
25. See, e.g., BARBARA K. ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 33 (1989) (describing surrogacy as reducing the woman 
to a container in order to fulfill a man’s desire to perpetuate his “seeds”). 
26. See, e.g., Anita Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 30 (1991) 
(“It has been said many times before, but it bears repeating: tolerating practices that convert 
women’s wombs and children into valuable market commodities threatens to deny them respect as 
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others have seen in it yet another opportunity for the economically 
privileged in this country to exploit the economically disadvantaged.27 In 
these analyses, women who contract to be surrogates are driven by 
financial need and would never consent to such arrangements if other 
avenues for economic survival were open to them; however, because of 
financial necessity, they agree to be physically, mentally, and 
emotionally damaged by a service they provide to the wealthy people 
who could afford to purchase it from them.28 In addition to economic 
exploitation, some critics see in surrogacy the exploitation of women 
who only consent to act as surrogates because they have failed to 
comprehend precisely what is at stake. Lina Peng describes critics as 
contending that surrogate mothers invariably are “emotionally unstable, 
uneducated, did not make informed decisions, and would regret their 
decisions and suffer long-term psychological damage.”29 The only way 
to protect women from the bad decisions that they would make due to 
their instabilities and lack of information and education is to prohibit 
them from being able to make the bad decision—to ban surrogacy. In 
this way, the psychological damage that they would inevitably suffer 
would be prevented.30 
equals. Commercial surrogacy encourages society to think of economically and socially vulnerable 
women as at its disposal for a price.”).  
27. See Jeremy Rifkin & Andrew Kimbrell, Put a Stop to Surrogate Parenting Now, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 20, 1990, at A8 (“Minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as ‘mother 
machines’ for embryos of middle and upper-class clients.”). 
28. See Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, 
11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 15, 35 (1989) (“[M]any poor women may agree to such arrangements, in 
part, because they have so few other job options, particularly paying $10,000 to $15,000 for nine 
months’ work. It may be difficult for a woman in financial distress to weigh accurately the 
advantages and disadvantages of surrogacy.”). 
29. Lina Peng, Surrogate Mothers: An Exploration of the Empirical and the Normative, 21 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 555, 557 (2013). 
30. See id. Interestingly, the argument that these critics of surrogacy make sounds eerily similar 
to the arguments that many anti-abortion activists have made. These activists have contended that 
women who decide to terminate pregnancies cannot make informed decisions; indeed, the fact that 
they have decided to undergo an abortion is evidence of their inability to make informed decisions. 
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 109, 143 (2009) (stating that opponents of abortions claim that mothers must be coerced into 
abortions because “[it] is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother to implicate herself in the 
killing [of] her own child” (quoting REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
ABORTION 56 (2005), available at http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/TaskForceReport.pdf)). The 
only way to protect them from the psychological damage that will inevitably result from the 
decision to terminate a pregnancy is to prevent them from being able to make the bad decision—to 
ban abortion. Id. Sadly for abortion rights activists, this line of argumentation has made it into the 
jurisprudence via Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 
(2007) (“[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can 
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A. Race and Surrogacy: First Generation Concerns 
Some commentators writing during the late 1980s to mid-1990s 
realized that the practice of surrogacy would necessarily take place on a 
national and global landscape marked by racial stratification and 
inequality.31 Given this reality, they thought it necessary to consider the 
racial implications of the practice before we, as a society, could 
intelligently decide whether it should be welcomed or withheld. And, 
through this lens, they were disturbed by what surrogacy could mean 
within this country and within the globe. This lens revealed to them that 
surrogacy does not simply involve the commoditization of aspects of life 
that never ought to be commoditized, but rather involves the 
commoditization of bodies of color for white benefit. It is not simply a 
means by which the wealthy can exploit the poor, but rather is a means 
by which wealthy white people can exploit poor people of color. It is not 
simply a practice in which women figure as commoditized vessels 
through which men could propagate their genes, but rather is a practice 
in which women of color figure as commoditized vessels through which 
white men could propagate their genes. 
Some commentators writing during this time imagined a dystopic 
future in which there exists a “breeder class” composed of indigent black 
women, their reproductive capacities readily available for purchase by 
infertile, wealthy white couples who seek to use black women’s bodies 
to overcome their own physical limitations and to have children that 
were their genetic progeny.32 Other commentators raised concerns about 
follow . . . . It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle 
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what 
she once did not know.”). 
31. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 24, at 263 (noting that because race follows class closely in the 
U.S., surrogacy arrangements will likely involve wealthy white families paying poor women of 
color to act as surrogates); Nita Bhalla, India’s Surrogacy Tourism: Exploitation or Empowerment, 
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.trust.org/item/20131004162151-
r5i0w/ (noting that commercial surrogacy in India usually involves wealthy couples from wealthier 
nations paying poor Indian women to act as surrogates). 
32. See Allen, supra note 26, at 30 (“Minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as 
‘mother machines’ for embryos of middle and upper-class clients. It’s a new, virulent form of racial 
and class discrimination. Within a decade, thousands of poor and minority women will likely be 
used as a ‘breeder class’ for those who can afford $30,000 to $40,000 to avoid the inconvenience 
and danger of pregnancy.”); April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial 
Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
83, 88 (2001) (noting the “potential for the operation of racism [to create] a breed of women of color 
prostituted in surrogacy”); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 28, at 34 (“The prospect of women of color 
carrying white babies is frightening and merits serious and immediate consideration. The idea of 
using poor and minority women as incubators for the white upper and middle classes raises serious 
moral and practical questions.”). 
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the existence of advanced reproductive technologies like surrogacy 
alongside coercive reproductive policies directed at poor, usually black, 
women—like forced sterilization, compelled contraceptive usage, and 
the incarceration of women who are addicted to drugs and their 
prosecution for child abuse.33 Professor Dorothy Roberts, for one, noted 
that surrogacy and its disproportionate use by white persons function to 
venerate white reproduction; meanwhile, other coercive reproductive 
policies aimed at black women function to discourage, disparage, and 
denounce black reproduction.34 
Moreover, critical thinkers about race were concerned about the role 
that race would play if disputes arose about the enforceability of 
surrogacy contracts should the surrogate change her mind about 
relinquishing the baby to the intended parents.35 The cases of Baby M36 
and Johnson v. Calvert37 realized these thinkers’ fears. Both cases 
involved surrogate mothers who changed their minds and sought to have 
the surrogacy contracts into which they had entered declared 
unenforceable.38 The surrogate in the Baby M case won, and the court 
deemed unenforceable the contract that voided her parental rights to the 
child that she bore;39 the surrogate in Johnson v. Calvert lost and was 
denied any legal rights to the child that she bore.40 Of note: the surrogate 
in the Baby M case was a white woman who gave birth to a white 
33. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 212 n.10. 
34. See id. at 210 (“As I have charted the proliferation of rhetoric and policies that degrade Black 
women’s reproductive decisions, I have also noticed that America is obsessed with creating and 
preserving white genetic ties. Trading the genetic tie on the market lays bare the high value placed 
on whiteness and the worthlessness accorded blackness.”). 
35. Interestingly, Peng has documented that very rarely have surrogates changed their minds 
about relinquishing the children that they carry to the intended parents. See Peng, supra note 29, at 
563 (“Out of 25,000 surrogacy arrangements estimated to have taken place since the 1970s, less 
than one percent of surrogate mothers have changed their minds and less than one-tenth of one 
percent of surrogacy cases end up in court battles.”). Indeed, she documents that surrogates usually 
conceptualize the surrender of the baby to the intended parents as a positive event. See id. (“Most 
surrogates have viewed the relinquishment of the baby as a happy event and have reported that they 
would be surrogates again. Longitudinal studies show that these attitudes remain stable over time.”). 
36. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
37. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
38. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778 (describing the facts of the case, in which the child’s birthmother 
refused to comply with the surrogacy contract); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1237 (same). 
39. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234 (“[I]n this case we grant custody to the natural father, the 
evidence having clearly proved such custody to be in the best interests of the infant, [and] we void 
both the termination of the surrogate mother’s parental rights and the adoption of the child by the 
wife/stepparent. We thus restore the ‘surrogate’ as the mother of the child.”). 
40. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778 (declaring the Calverts as the child’s natural parents). 
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baby;41 the surrogate in Johnson v. Calvert was a black woman who 
gave birth to a white baby.42 The cases can be reconciled without 
allowing the race of the surrogates to have explanatory value because 
they involved different types of surrogacy: Baby M involved a traditional 
surrogacy arrangement within which the surrogate was genetically 
related to the child to whom she gave birth;43 Johnson v. Calvert 
involved a gestational surrogacy arrangement within which the surrogate 
was genetically unrelated to the child to whom she gave birth.44 The 
Baby M court found it unconscionable to separate a woman from her 
own genetic offspring.45 On the contrary, the Johnson v. Calvert court 
was relatively undisturbed that its decision meant that a woman would 
have to be separated from a child with which she had no genetic46 
relationship.47 
41. Cherry, supra note 32, at 89 (explaining that the surrogate mother in the Baby M case was 
white). 
42. Id. at 86 (explaining that Anna Johnson, the surrogate in the Johnson case, was an African-
American single mother). 
43. Id. at 89–90 (describing the Baby M case as one having to do with a traditional surrogacy 
agreement). 
44. Id. at 90 (describing the Johnson case as one involving a gestational surrogacy agreement). 
45. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–47 (N.J. 1988) (“The surrogacy contract guarantees 
permanent separation of the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, however, has long 
been that to the extent possible, children should remain with and be brought up by both of their 
natural parents.”). 
46. The court’s privileging of the fact that there was no genetic relationship between Anna 
Johnson and the baby that she bore caused it to dismiss the fact that Johnson had an extensive 
biological relationship with the baby. Her biological processes inevitably influenced—indeed, 
enabled—the baby’s own biological processes. And certainly, the baby’s biological processes 
impacted her own. 
47. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (“We conclude that although the Act 
recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the 
child—that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her 
own—is the natural mother under California law.”). Some commentators have argued that part of 
the motivation for the judge’s decision to deny Johnson legal rights to the child that she bore was 
his, perhaps unconscious, sense that a black woman could not be a mother to a phenotypically white 
child. See Allen, supra note 26, at 23. Certainly, black women are thought capable of mothering 
white children. See id. (noting that “[t]hroughout history, Black women and mulatto women have 
been hired or enslaved to play a number of important de facto ‘mothering’ roles in American 
families”); Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 28, at 35 (noting that Black women have mothered white 
children throughout history by acting as wet-nurses and nannies); Cherry, supra note 32, at 117 
(observing that black women have always been “called upon to perform affective labor for White 
families” and noting that “[b]lack women traditionally have performed the affective labor of caring 
for White families’ homes and children in disproportionate numbers”). Nevertheless, they are 
thought incapable of being actual—and legal—mothers of white children. See Allen, supra note 26, 
at 23 (observing that although black women have mothered white children throughout history, “few 
regard Black women as the appropriate legal mothers of children who are not at least part Black” 
 
                                                     
 
07 - Bridges_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014  6:28 PM 
2014] WINDSOR, SURROGACY, & RACE 1137 
Critical thinkers about race found these decisions immensely 
problematic. One begins to understand these thinkers’ discontent by 
observing that, despite the fact that people of color suffer from infertility 
at higher rates,48 white people are the primary consumers of advanced 
reproductive technologies, including surrogacy.49 Further, because the 
traits that code for race oftentimes are passed through genes,50 a white 
and observing that many believe that “Blacks are not supposed to have white children” and “Blacks 
are not supposed to want to have white children of their own—not in the adoption context and not, 
therefore, in the surrogacy context.”). 
48. See Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 28, at 32 (“Black women have an infertility rate one and one-
half times higher than that of white women.”); Roberts, supra note 24, at 244 (“The use of fertility 
clinics does not correspond to rates of infertility. Indeed, the profile of people most likely to attempt 
IVF is precisely the opposite of those most likely to be infertile. The people in the United States 
most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black, and poorly educated.”). 
49. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 244 (noting that “[o]ne of the most striking features of these 
technological efforts to provide parents with genetically related offspring is that they are used 
almost exclusively by affluent white people” and observing that “[m]ost couples who use IVF 
services are white, highly educated, and affluent”).  
50. I choose to say that “the traits that code for race oftentimes are passed through genes” instead 
of “race is transmitted through genes” in order to clearly align myself with the body of thought that 
rejects the idea of biological race, choosing instead to conceptualize race as a social construction. 
The concept of biological race posits that races are genetically distinct or homogenous entities. See 
Deborah A. Bolnick, Individual Ancestry Inference and the Reification of Race as a Biological 
Phenomenon, in REVISITING RACE IN A GENOMIC AGE 70, 73 (Barbara A. Koenig et al. eds., 2008) 
(observing that while “traditional notions of race” are variable, “most describe racial groups as 
equivalent, biologically distinct units”). According to notions of biological race, race is passed 
along through the racial genes that members of that group possess. However, the weight of good 
science is against the concept of biological race. See, e.g., ASHLEY MONTAGU, STATEMENT ON 
RACE: AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION IN PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UNESCO STATEMENT BY EXPERTS 
ON RACE PROBLEMS 15 (1951) (noting that race “is not so much a biological phenomenon as it is a 
social myth”); Charles N. Rotimi, Are Medical and Nonmedical Uses of Large-Scale Genomic 
Markers Conflating Genetics and “Race”?, 36 NATURE GENETICS S43, S44 (2004) (noting that 
“[t]o reap the full benefits of the Human Genome Project . . . we must be willing to move 
beyond . . . defined social proxies of genetic relatedness like ‘race’”); David R. Williams, Race and 
Health: Basic Questions, Emerging Directions, 7 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 322, 323 (1997) 
(noting the “growing consensus that racial classification schemes do not reflect genetic 
homogeneity”); Ritchie Witzig, The Medicalization of Race: Scientific Legitimization of a Flawed 
Social Construct, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 675, 678 (1996) (arguing that “race groupings 
are not biologically or anthropologically relevant”). Race, instead, is a social construction—formed 
by social and political processes, not biological processes. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, 
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 4 (2d ed. 1994) 
(describing the theory of racial formation as one that “emphasizes the social nature of race, the 
absence of any essential racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and 
categories, . . . and the irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics.”); Camara Phyllis Jones, 
Invited Commentary: “Race,” Racism, and the Practice of Epidemiology, 154 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 299, 300 (2001) (“Race is a social construct, a social classification based on a 
phenotype, that governs the distribution of risks and opportunities in our race-conscious society.”). 
Accordingly, race is not passed through the genes; instead, features (like skin color, eye shape, nose 
width, hair texture, etc.) that code for race in any particular sociopolitical moment are transmitted 
through genes. 
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couple seeking a traditional surrogacy arrangement (in which the 
surrogate is genetically related to the child that she bears) will look to a 
white woman to act as a traditional surrogate because of the latter’s 
ability to give birth to a white baby and because of the couple’s likely 
desire to have a baby that shares their racial ascription and identification. 
Black women and other women of color would not be sought after to act 
as traditional surrogates because they would likely be unable to give 
birth to the white children that the intended parents desire. On the other 
hand, women of color would be sought after to act as gestational 
surrogates because, having no genetic relationship to the children that 
they bear, they would be able to give birth to phenotypically white 
babies for the white couples that desire them.51 As the Baby M and 
Johnson v. Calvert cases dramatized, white women acting as traditional 
surrogates would get rights to the babies that they bear if they changed 
their minds about surrendering the children to the intended parents. 
Simultaneously, women of color acting as gestational surrogates would 
have to relinquish the babies that they bear to the intended parents if 
they, similarly, changed their minds. Critical thinkers about race writing 
at the time that these cases were decided—scholars who were interested 
in interrupting the sometimes obvious, oftentimes obscure processes by 
which racial inequality in this country is reproduced—considered it self-
evident that they should challenge a legal regime that recognizes the 
labor that white women perform while discounting and rendering 
invisible the labor that women of color perform.52 
Moreover, to the extent that women of color, specifically black 
women, would be commissioned to act as gestational surrogates, critical 
thinkers about race writing during the late 1980s to mid-1990s thought 
the parallels to slavery were just too obvious to ignore. During the 
centuries of chattel slavery in the United States, enslaved black women 
were essentially surrogates: because their owners also owned all of the 
products of their labor, the women did not have any legal claim to the 
children they bore.53 Just like Anna Johnson, the surrogate at the center 
of the dispute in Johnson v. Calvert, enslaved women bore for another’s 
51. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 263 (“Gestational surrogacy invokes the possibility that white 
middle-class couples will use women of color to gestate their babies. Since contracting couples need 
not be concerned about the surrogate’s genetic qualities (most importantly, her race), they may 
favor hiring the most economically vulnerable women in order to secure the lowest price for their 
services.”). 
52. Id. 
53. See Allen, supra note 26, at 17–18 (“Before the American Civil War, virtually all southern 
Black mothers were, in a sense, surrogate mothers. Slave women knowingly gave birth to children 
with the understanding that those children would be owned by others.”) 
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benefit children to whom they had no recognized legal claim.54 
B. Race and Surrogacy: Second Generation Concerns 
Interestingly, the fears that critical thinkers about race had about the 
potential of surrogacy in the U.S. to result in a class of indigent black 
women being used for the benefit of wealthy white people were not 
realized. As Peng delineates quite clearly, surrogates in the U.S. do not 
tend to be uneducated, poor, or racial minorities; further, they do not 
tend to be unaware of the psychological and physical risks that 
surrogacy entails.55 In fact, surrogates in the U.S. actually tend to be 
fairly well educated,56 financially stable,57 white women58 who choose to 
become surrogates for a plethora of reasons; very rarely do those reasons 
involve financial imperatives.59 
54. See Anita Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
139, 144 (1990) (“[A]s a result of the American slave laws, all black mothers were de facto 
surrogates. Children born to slaves were owned by Master X or Mistress Y and could be sold at any 
time to another owner. Slave women gave birth to children with the understanding that those 
children would be owned by others.”). It may be important to note that, while Allen argues that 
surrogacy and reproduction during the period of chattel slavery have important elements in 
common, she also notes that there is a danger involved in understanding the two as morally 
indistinguishable practices: “By treating the two practices as moral equivalents, one ignores the 
enormous scope of control the slave owner exerts over the slave, a feature quite lacking in surrogacy 
arrangements.” Id. at 142. 
55. See Peng, supra note 29, at 560 (“The profile of surrogate mothers emerging from the 
empirical research in the United States and Britain does not support the stereotype of poor, single, 
young, ethnic minority women whose family, financial difficulties, or other circumstances pressure 
her into a surrogacy arrangement. Nor does it support the view that surrogate mothers are naively 
taking on a task unaware of the emotional and physical risks it might entail. Rather, the empirical 
research establishes that surrogate mothers are mature, experienced, stable, self-aware, and 
extroverted non-conformists who make the initial decision that surrogacy is something that they 
want to do.” (quoting Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist 
Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 51–52 (2010)). 
56. See id. at 561 (noting that “[s]urrogates have varying degrees of education, but a large 
proportion have had some higher education”). 
57. See id. at 563–64 (citing Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: 
An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 611 J. SOC. ISSUES 21, 31 (2005)) (observing 
that “research has not revealed that surrogate mothers are financially desperate” and citing studies 
that show that surrogates’ incomes tended to be modest (rather than low) and hovered around the 
median income level in the United States). 
58. See id. at 560–61 (citing one study showing that the vast majority of surrogates are 
“Caucasian, Christian, and in their late 20–early 30s” and another showing that surrogates are 
“predominantly white” (citing Busby & Vun, supra note 55, at 42)). 
59. See id. at 564 (citing one study within which only a “handful of women mentioned money as 
their main motivator” for becoming surrogates and another that “concluded that money was rarely 
the sole or even the primary reason for entering the surrogacy arrangement” (citing Ciccarelli & 
Beckman, supra note 57, at 30)). The reasons women cited for wanting to become surrogates were 
varied: “most surrogates reported enjoying pregnancy and childbirth, and many noted that surrogacy 
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Now, although we have not witnessed in the U.S. the development of 
a “breeder class” of indigent black women having white babies for the 
wealthy white couples who can afford to purchase their reproductive 
capacities, critical thinkers about race may still find reason to be 
troubled by the practice of surrogacy. As Peng insightfully notes, 
[I]f the actual experience of surrogate mothers can be tabled as a 
reason for opposing surrogacy, then a different lens crystallizes: 
the issue is no longer about whether to protect a vulnerable class 
of women from making a decision harmful to themselves, but 
whether to restrict individual freedom for the benefit of better 
normative social ordering.60 
Accordingly, critical thinkers about race may wonder about the effect 
that surrogacy may have on racial inequality in this country despite the 
fact that women of color are not being commissioned to act as 
surrogates. And critical thinkers about race may be disturbed by that 
very fact: women of color are not being commissioned to act as 
surrogates. We have to wonder why. It might be that the reproductive 
capacities of white women are simply more highly valued than those of 
women of color. It is possible that wealthy white couples that hire 
surrogates deem women of color untrustworthy. They may believe that 
women of color will somehow harm the children that they carry. As 
Dorothy Roberts writes, “Black mothers are seen to corrupt the 
reproduction process at every stage . . . . They damage their babies in the 
womb through their bad habits during pregnancy.”61 Perhaps these 
discourses that construct black reproduction as a form of degeneracy 
explain the happenstance of white women being hired as surrogates to 
the exclusion of black women. Which is to say: the racial geography of 
surrogacy may nevertheless disturb critical thinkers about race. We 
might advocate for surrogacy’s restriction because we think that 
eliminating this racial geography results in a better normative social 
ordering. 
Further, transnational commercial surrogacy arrangements have 
become increasingly popular in recent years. In India, which is one of a 
few countries that have not proscribed the practice, commercial 
surrogacy is big business.62 Wealthy couples are traveling to the country 
increased their fulfillment and self-confidence and opened up their social circles. Others indicated 
that it allowed them a way to continue being a mother to their own children.” Id. 
60. Id. at 558.  
61. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY 9 (1997). 
62. See Bhalla, supra note 31 (noting that while commercial surrogacy is banned in most 
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in large numbers to hire invariably indigent Indian women to carry and 
give birth to the couples’ genetic progeny.63 In this context, the concerns 
that critical thinkers about race have articulated about the ownership and 
exploitation of the bodies of women of color for white benefit have 
come to be realized. 
And there is always the possibility that, in the future, couples seeking 
surrogates will turn to U.S.-born women of color. 
Essentially, surrogacy may create a racial catch-22: the 
commissioning of women of color to act as surrogates may be as 
terrifying as the failure to commission women of color to act as 
surrogates. 
III. RETHINKING THE RACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
SURROGACY POST-WINDSOR? 
We must ask whether critical thinkers about race should reconsider 
their distaste for surrogacy in light of the new context provided by the 
legalization of same-sex marriages and Windsor’s legitimation of 
families headed by same-sex couples. That is: does the practice of 
surrogacy become less problematic when the intended parents are a 
same-sex couple? Are the disturbing racial implications of surrogacy 
eliminated, or at least somewhat muted, when the practice is 
commissioned by a same-sex couple desiring to start a family? 
There may be something quite different about surrogacy when it is 
same-sex couples, instead of privileged different-sex couples, that are 
using the bodies of relatively unprivileged women to produce their 
families. While some LGBT persons may enjoy privileges (of class and 
race, for example), it would be wrong to claim that they are privileged in 
every respect. That is, as sexual minorities, they lack a privilege that 
heterosexual, cisgender64 persons enjoy. Ours is a society in which 
LGBT persons are currently battling to win some semblance of formal 
equality—let alone substantive equality.65 And the fight for formal 
countries, India is “free of regulation” and describing commercial surrogacy in India as “a lucrative, 
$400 million-a-year business with over 3,000 fertility clinics across India that recruit poor, 
uneducated women to carry the embryos of others through to birth”). 
63. See id. 
64. “Cisgender” is a term that refers to people who are not transgender. See Dean Spade, Be 
Professional!, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 71, 76 n.6 (2010). 
65. It is important not to equate formal equality with substantive equality. Should LGBT persons 
win formal equality under law, inequalities between LGBT persons and their heterosexual, 
cisgender counterparts will likely endure due to the operation of structural and institutional forces. 
See Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1010, 1066 
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equality is far from over. While Windsor is significant insofar as it 
prohibits the federal government from discriminating between different-
sex marriages and same-sex marriages that are recognized by the 
states,66 it does not directly speak to the constitutionality of states 
denying same-sex couples the right to marry.67 Indeed, at the time of 
printing, in fifteen states, individuals do not have the right to marry their 
partners if they are of the same sex.68 If equality means equal rights, then 
LGBT persons do not enjoy equality in this country. 
Moreover, marriage equality may be the tip of the iceberg. In many 
jurisdictions, LGBT persons are not protected from discrimination 
(2014) (“It would be remarkable if over a century of legal condemnation and attempted erasure of 
same-sex desire did not leave a mark . . . . Advocates for LGBT people should think more critically 
about the enduring effects of homophobia as well as the structural obstacles that same-sex couples 
are likely to face.”). 
66. Windsor may be far more significant from a discursive perspective. That is, it may bring 
only insubstantial material changes to the lives of LGBT persons. First, the only individuals that 
directly benefit from the decision are those who are married to partners of the same-sex. That may 
be a small slice of a larger LGBT community. See Same-Sex Couple Households by Sex, Partner 
Status and Presence of Children—States: 2010, 2014 PROQUEST STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 60 
(stating that the U.S. Census estimated 646,464 same-sex households with 131,729 reporting that 
they were married, which is about twenty percent of same-sex households). Second, the practical 
benefits that this slice receives may be modest. See United States v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2694 (2013) (noting that DOMA deprives same-sex couples of the “Bankruptcy Code’s 
special protections for domestic-support obligations [and it] forces them to follow a complicated 
procedure to file their state and federal taxes jointly”). Moreover, those benefits might be offset by 
the disadvantages that are concomitant to those benefits. See id. at 2695 (noting that DOMA 
exempts same-sex married couples from considering the income of both spouses when calculating 
financial aid eligibility, and it also exempts same-sex married couples from certain rules designed to 
prohibit conflicts of interest that result when a person’s spouse has a financial interest in activities in 
which he/she is involved). Of course, those “disadvantages” may seem like benefits when one 
considers that they are a product of the fact that the state recognizes the relationship. 
However, Windsor is much more significant when one considers the cultural work that it does. It 
communicates the message that LGBT persons are not deviants within the body politic. Indeed, far 
from being dangerous aberrations that should be expunged from society or strange anomalies that 
should be merely tolerated, Windsor declares that sexual minorities are to be embraced as equal and 
valued contributors to the nation. In this sense, Windsor is quite a landmark decision. 
67. Of course, as Justice Scalia laments in his characteristically spirited dissent, the logic of the 
decision is consistent with a finding that it is unconstitutional for states to deny individuals the 
ability to marry partners of the same sex. See id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (performing a 
series of slight alterations to the text of the majority opinion in order to illustrate how little of it 
needs to be changed in order to transform the opinion into one that declares the unconstitutionality 
of state laws limiting marriage to different-sex couples). In his Article for this symposium, Dean 
Infanti has compiled a comprehensive, state-by-state chronology of the decisions since Windsor in 
which courts have taken Justice Scalia at his word and have struck down state marriage bans. See 
Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax 
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1188−1210 (2014).  
68. Freedom to Marry—States, FREEDOM TO MARRY.ORG, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ 
states/ (last visited November 25, 2014). 
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through civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and/or gender identity.69 Accordingly, in many 
jurisdictions, it is still perfectly legal to deny sexual minorities housing, 
employment, education, and public accommodations—indeed, the basic 
stuff of citizenship—because of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity. Further, one cannot confidently claim that the law and the 
society it regulates are definitely on a path that will inevitably end in 
sexual minorities being determined to be legally indistinguishable from 
their heterosexual, cisgender counterparts. That is, it is not at all clear 
how the law will answer the question of “religious accommodations” 
and “religious exemptions”—specifically whether religious 
organizations can be exempted from civil rights laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity 
when that prohibition conflicts with their tenets.70 As such, it is not at all 
clear that LGBT persons will ever be free from state-sanctioned 
discrimination. The courts may determine that such discrimination is 
allowed—indeed, the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act may protect it—as long as a religious entity is the 
perpetrator of the discrimination. 
To argue that sexual minorities lack the privileges that their 
heterosexual, cisgender counterparts have, one need not look solely at 
the patchwork of antidiscrimination laws and the uncertainty of whether 
the courts will answer the question of religious accommodations so as to 
maintain LGBT persons’ second-class citizenship status. One can also 
69. Significantly, it was less than twenty years ago that Justice Scalia (and others) characterized 
laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as giving “special rights” and 
“special protections” to sexual minorities. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641–42 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (describing Amendment 2, which prohibited at any level of Colorado government the 
passage of laws that protected LGBT persons from discrimination, as prohibiting the passage of 
laws that gave “special favors” or “special protections” to this group). Indeed, one organization 
opposed to allowing LGBT persons to receive protections under basic antidiscrimination statutes 
disseminated a video titled “Gay Rights/Special Rights,” in which it made the claim that is the title 
of the video. See Ninja Scroll, Gay Rights, Special Rights: Inside the Homosexual Agenda, 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPZv6cATn-w (last visited June 16, 
2014). If basic protections against discrimination give something “special” to sexual minorities, 
then it follows that those basic protections are undeserved. It was less than twenty years ago that a 
Justice that sits on this nation’s highest Court made that argument. This may imply that we, as a 
nation, are farther away from treating sexual minorities as equals than Windsor suggests. 
70. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exempts a closely held, for-profit corporation from a law 
that conflicts with the owners’ religious beliefs). While Hobby Lobby speaks neither to the religious 
rights that non-closely held companies have nor to the rights that corporations may or may not have 
under the First Amendment, it certainly does not close the door to corporations and individuals 
arguing that they ought to be exempt from laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity because the prohibition conflicts with their religious beliefs.  
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look at the fact that sexual minorities are victims of crimes directed at 
them because of sexual orientation and/or gender identity at rates that 
dwarf their counterparts. The National Coalition of Anti-Violence 
Programs (“NCAVP”) reports that over 2000 LGBT persons were 
victims of bias-motivated violence in 2012.71 Twenty-five persons were 
killed.72 Moreover, more than half of persons who identify as LGBT 
report being concerned about being a victim of bias-motivated 
violence.73 This is a concern that most non-LGBT persons simply do not 
have.74 That sexual minorities are unprivileged relative to heterosexual 
and cisgender individuals is also demonstrated by the vulnerability 
experienced by many LGBT youth. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control (“CDC”), reports from LGBT youth indicate that eighty percent 
of LGBT youth had been verbally harassed at school, forty percent had 
been physically harassed, and twenty percent had been the victims of a 
physical assault.75 The CDC also reports that LGBT youth have higher 
rates of suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and suicide than their 
heterosexual, cisgender counterparts.76 
So, yes: it may be fair to characterize LGBT persons as unprivileged. 
Accordingly, should LGBT persons look to poorer women of color—
women who do not enjoy class and race privilege—for their assistance 
in producing the families that they desire, then we as a society will 
witness the unprivileged helping the unprivileged. And we might 
understand that as a revolutionary alliance. Undeniably, the racial 
geography that disquieted many critical thinkers about race could still be 
realized. Because race privilege follows class privilege closely in this 
country, those same-sex couples with the money to afford a surrogacy 
arrangement will likely be white. Thus, we may still witness wealthy 
71. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, 
QUEER, AND HIV-AFFECTED HATE VIOLENCE IN 2012 8 (2013), available at 
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/ncavp_2012_hvreport_final.pdf. Note that LGBT persons of 
color are almost twice as likely to be victims of violence and discrimination as are white LGBT 
persons. Id. at 9.  
72. Id. 
73. MICHELLE A. MARZULLO & ALYN J. LIBMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, HATE CRIMES 
AND VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 7 (2009), 
available at http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Hatecrime 
sandviolenceagainstlgbtpeople_2009.pdf.  
74. See id. (“Less than one in 10 out of the general population (6 percent in 2007 and 7 percent in 
2006) frequently worries about hate violence; just more than half (55 percent in 2007 and 52 percent 
in 2006) never worry about becoming the victim of a hate crime.”).  
75. See Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health—Youth, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm (last visited May 22, 2014). 
76. Id. 
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white persons commoditizing the bodies and reproductive capacities of 
poorer black, Latina, and Indian women. However, that the privileged 
whites commoditizing the bodies of women of color are simultaneously 
unprivileged sexual minorities may perhaps temper the disquieting 
aspects of the racial geography. Might we conceptualize surrogates as 
black, Latina, and Indian allies to LGBT persons and communities? And 
in light of the perception that communities of color in the U.S. do not 
support the movement for full civil rights for sexual minorities,77 might 
this alliance be worthy of celebration? 
But then again, critical thinkers about race have been careful in other 
contexts not to celebrate the disadvantaging of unprivileged groups by 
other unprivileged groups.78 Indeed, the emergence of Latino Critical 
Race Studies, or LatCrit, can be understood as an effort to challenge the 
disadvantaging of one unprivileged racial group by another unprivileged 
racial group. LatCrit was a response to the silencing of Latinos’ 
experiences with racial discrimination in traditional Critical Race Theory 
(CRT).79 LatCrit charged that CRT utilized a black/white paradigm of 
race relations and racism, making it difficult and oftentimes impossible 
for CRT theorists to see the racism in practices to which black people 
were not subjected.80 For example, the black/white paradigm rendered 
unrecognizable as racism discrimination on the basis of language, 
accent, and immigration status—forms of discrimination that were not 
leveled against United States-born black people, but to which Latinos, 
Asians, and other non-black racial minorities were commonly 
subjected.81 LatCrit criticized CRT for being somewhat willfully blind to 
the experiences of non-black racial minorities—for seemingly wanting 
to have a monopoly on racial victimhood and to dominate the 
77. See Robinson, supra note 65, at 1021–35 (documenting the prevalence of the belief that black 
people did not support civil rights for LGBT people after the former were unfairly blamed for the 
passage of Proposition 8 in California, which stripped LGBT persons of their right to marry their 
partners). 
78. See also id. at 1037 (discussing the “hierarchies among sexual minorities” as well as the 
“descriptive claim that minorities do not discriminate against other minorities”). 
79. See Leslie Espinosa & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar Baby—LatCrit 
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1615 (1997) (noting the “black/brown 
conflict” that can describe the LatCrit critique of traditional CRT). 
80. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American 
Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1997) (arguing that “the Black/White binary 
paradigm operates to exclude Latinos/as from full membership and participation in racial discourse” 
and contending that the “exclusion serves to perpetuate not only the paradigm itself but also 
negative stereotypes of Latinos/as”).  
81. See Espinosa & Harris, supra note 79, at 1618 (describing how language and accent 
discrimination is “invisible” within the black/white paradigm of race relations). 
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conversation about racial suffering in the United States.82 It is fair to say 
that CRT has taken seriously LatCrit’s critique and has developed a 
richer understanding of race and racism in the years since the critique 
was first articulated.83 This history of the dialogue between LatCrit and 
CRT should serve to demonstrate that critical thinkers about race have 
been careful not to greet the disadvantaging of disempowered groups by 
other disempowered groups as wanted; indeed, they would certainly 
refuse to describe exploitation of one unprivileged group by another as a 
revolutionary alliance. We as a society might be well advised not to do 
so in the context of surrogacy. We might condemn the exploitation of 
those who are unprivileged by virtue of class and race at the hands of 
those who are unprivileged by sexual orientation. Further, we ought to 
be aware that those who would be purchasing the services of surrogates, 
although unprivileged by virtue of sexual orientation, would remain 
privileged by virtue of race and class.84 
Moreover, we might be aware of the fractures within the LGBT 
community around the issue of same-sex marriage. Some LGBT 
persons, many of whom are racial minorities, are critical of the 
prioritization of marriage equality.85 They fear that those who will enjoy 
82. See id. at 1615 (articulating the sense that black Americans had “bought the franchise on race 
victimhood and [did not] want to share the territory of suffering—and righteous indignation—with 
other outsider groups”). 
83. See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS 
A SITE OF RACIALIZATION (2011) (analyzing the complex racial discourses that operate in an 
obstetrics clinic serving an incredibly diverse population of poor women seeking prenatal care).  
84. See Robinson, supra note 65, at 1036 n.125 (noting that when “whites come out as LGB, they 
may for the first time form an identity as a minority”; however, it “does not automatically erase a 
lifetime of experiences as a fully privileged white American, nor does it eradicate the white 
privilege that LGB people enjoy even when fully out of the closet”).  
85. See Marlon M. Bailey, Priya Kandaswamy & Mattie Udora Richardson, Is Gay Marriage 
Racist?, in THAT’S REVOLTING!: QUEER STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING ASSIMILATION 113, 117 
(Mattilda Bernstein Sycamore ed., 2008) (contending that the movement for same-sex marriage “is 
led by white middle-class gays and lesbians who would largely benefit from same-sex marriage”); 
Feinberg, supra note 4, at 258–59 (“The movement’s focus on marriage equality as opposed to 
acquiring legal rights and protections to serve the needs of the diverse relationship and familial 
forms in existence today without regard to marriage eligibility (pluralistic relationship recognition) 
has long been the subject of criticism by many individuals within the LGBT rights 
movement.”).While many critics of the marriage equality movement have been racial minorities, 
many racial minorities are strong supporters of the movement. See JUAN BATTLE ET AL., NAT’L 
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SAY IT LOUD: I’M BLACK AND I’M PROUD 29 (2002), available at 
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/SayItLoudBlackAndProud.pdf 
(noting that the LGBT persons of color who were surveyed ranked marriage equality as the third 
most important issue their community faced and observing that the survey results “contradict[] the 
position of those, most often on the left, who see marriage as an issue most salient to White GLBT 
communities”).  
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in practice the security that the marriage right brings in theory are those 
who are the most privileged members of the LGBT community—
wealthy white people.86 Some LGBT persons argue that the energies of 
the community are better spent working to produce change that could 
make less precarious the lives of the most marginalized sexual 
minorities.87 Given the tragic vulnerability of many poor black and 
Latino LGBT persons, and given the likelihood that marriage equality 
will do nothing to change their desperate circumstances, these voices 
argue that fighting for the right to marry is an exorbitant luxury—a 
disastrous waste of resources.88 
86. See, e.g., JUAN BATTLE ET AL., supra note 85, at 29 (observing that “some progressives and 
radicals within the GLBT movement argue that the prioritization of civil marriage rights reflects the 
dominance of the movement by White, middle class people” and that “[s]ome have even said 
marriage is a ‘White’ gay issue”); Bailey, Kandaswamy & Richardson, supra note 85, at 115–16 
(“We should not assume, in a racist, sexist, heterosexist and homophobic society, that all people will 
have access to the so-called rights and privileges that marriage purports to offer . . . . For many 
Black people, marriage has never been the answer to these problems simply because Black people’s 
social institutions are not seen as institutions worth honoring.”). In an insightful article, Luke Boso 
notes that simply coming out as LGBT may be a luxury of the privileged. Luke Boso, Urban Bias, 
Rural Sexual Minorities, and the Courts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 599 (2013). He notes that for many 
individuals residing in rural parts of the country, coming out may not be a tenable option, given the 
hostility that may greet public affirmations of LGBT identity. He writes that “coming out [might] be 
self-destructive or even dangerous” if there is not a welcoming community that will greet such 
affirmations. Id. at 597. Because of the dangers of public affirmations of LGBT identity, as well as 
the possibility that declaring such an identity may overwhelm other equally salient identities that 
persons have, many individuals residing in rural parts of the nation do not choose to identify as 
LGBT—even to themselves. See id. at 596 (“Rural sexual minorities who come out, or tell others 
that they are gay, risk being seen only through the prism of sexual orientation, regardless of how 
significant or insignificant sexuality is to their individual identities. Reflecting this reality, many 
rural people who have same-sex desire or same-sex sex reject LGB identities.”); id. (“[B]ecause 
many rural sexual minorities are detached from dominant narratives about gay culture and identity, 
or are unable to access gay communities and amenities tangibly, they simply decline to self-identity 
as LGB because they feel excluded by these purported indicia of gay culture.”). If coming out as 
LGBT is a privilege that many of those who reside in rural areas do not have, then it is clear that the 
right to marry a person of the same-sex would mean very little to them. Boso also notes that some 
LGBT persons residing in rural parts of the country may strike a compromise with their 
communities: although their same-sex desires and relationships may be known generally, they will 
not “engage in overt same-sex intimacy or other markers of gay identity” in exchange for the ability 
“to participate in community life.” Id. at 598. It may be that marrying an individual of the same sex 
would violate this “unspoken transactional bargain.” Id.  
87. See, e.g., Bailey, Kandaswamy & Richardson, supra note 85, at 117–18 (arguing that the 
leaders of the movement for same-sex marriage “are not concerned about . . . the vast majority of 
people of color who do not enjoy such social mobility and who are largely disenfranchised, and who 
need health care and don’t have it,” and contending that when these leaders characterize marriage 
equality as the “‘last barrier’ to full citizenship . . . [t]his argument is a slap in the face to everyone 
who continues to experience institutionalized oppression in this country”). 
88. See id. at 119 (arguing that “marriage is not even a first step for addressing the needs of queer 
people”); Boso, supra note 86, at 608 (noting that “issues considered most pressing for urban gays 
and lesbians, such as marriage equality or obtaining benefits for same-sex partners, may lack the 
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These critics of the movement for marriage equality would balk at the 
suggestion that Windsor declares legitimate all families that are headed 
by parents of the same sex. They would argue that Windsor declares the 
legitimacy of only some families that are headed by parents who are of 
the same sex. The analogy is to the jurisprudence that declares the 
sanctity of the family and declares the principle that the state ought not 
to cross the highly idealized line that separates the public from the 
private family.89 Indeed, the Court has spoken of a “private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter.”90 Yet, this private realm exists 
solely in theory for many poor families of color. The state’s power of 
parens patriae gives the state the ability to override individuals’ rights to 
keep the government out of their private families if the state intervenes 
in order to protect children from abuse and neglect. This parens patriae 
power is often invoked to justify the state’s regulation of poor families.91 
And while it is not entirely clear that children in poor families are more 
frequently abused and neglected,92 it is entirely clear that these families 
same urgency for economically and geographically marginalized sexual minorities” and observing 
that, for rural sexual minorities, “access to basic resources may constitute even more pressing 
‘homosexual issues’”); Robinson, supra note 65, at 1038 (noting that “[w]ealthy white males 
dominate the gay rights agenda, which prioritizes rights that are most meaningful for people who 
are middle or upper class and neglects the discrimination faced by poorer LGBT people, such as in 
the contexts of immigration and mass incarceration”). 
89. Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation 
to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 520 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has long interpreted 
the Constitution as creating a zone of privacy that insulates families from state intrusion.”).  
90. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
91. See Kindred, supra note 89, at 530–31 (“Although there is a general lack of consensus as to 
standards establishing what constitutes neglect or when a court should declare a particular child as 
neglected, poverty is a common characteristic of families charged with neglect. Evidence suggests 
that the state routinely intercedes in poor families and that poor children are more likely to end up in 
the foster care system than are children of other classes.”). 
92. Some scholars have disputed the assumption that poor parents are more likely to abuse or 
neglect their children. They argue instead that officials perceive non-abusive and non-neglectful 
parenting behaviors as abuse and neglect because they view these behaviors through a dominant 
cultural lens. See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 788–89 (2001) (“Neglect and, to a lesser extent, abuse, are problematic 
standards that are extraordinarily contingent on cultural norms of decisionmakers. Many . . . have 
criticized these standards as class-based and racially discriminatory.”). There is also a strong 
argument that poor mothers are more likely to come within the ambit of child protective services not 
because they are more abusive or neglectful towards their children, but rather because they do not 
conform to traditional ideas of how women are supposed to behave. See Annette Ruth Appell, 
Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection 
System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 579 (1997) [hereinafter Appell, Protecting Children] (noting that 
some poor mothers of color “deviate from the normative notions of mother and womanhood and are 
defined as bad”); Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of 
Parental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (1995) (arguing that the termination of parental 
rights is often “not based on the mother having harmed the child, but rather on the mother exhibiting 
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are more frequently regulated pursuant to the state’s power of parens 
patriae.93 The result is that there may be two principles that govern 
families in this country: one of nonintervention for wealthier families 
and another of intervention for poorer families, who are 
disproportionately of color. Writes one observer, 
In the U.S., race is the strongest determinant of whether or not 
the state chooses to recognize your parental ties. Black families 
are the most likely of any racial group to be disrupted by Child 
Protection authorities, and 42 percent of all children in foster 
care in the U.S. are black.94 
There may be little reason to believe that things would be any 
different for families of color that are headed by same-sex spouses. That 
is, while Windsor declares the legitimacy of same-sex marriages and the 
families produced by the spouses involved in those marriages, it may not 
declare the legitimacy of same-sex marriages and the families produced 
by the spouses involved in those marriages when the spouses are people 
of color. As one commentator has noted: 
If being married doesn’t protect straight black families from 
having their children taken away, it’s unlikely that it will protect 
queer black families . . . . While marriage might offer limited 
protections to some people, it will not change the 
the characteristics of being a bad woman” and concluding that “[s]ince bad women can never be 
good mothers, their relationships with their children are terminated on that basis”).Thus, the state’s 
power of parens patriae takes on a more punitive, instead of protective, cast. See Appell, Protecting 
Children, supra, at 579 (describing child protective services as an “often punitive, rather than 
empowering, system focused more on mothers than on their children”). Finally, there is the 
argument that poor families come within the ambit of child protective services more frequently 
simply because they lead more public lives—having to rely on public services and institutions more 
often than their wealthier counterparts. Appell makes this point quite eloquently: 
Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because they lack power and resources 
and because they are more directly involved with governmental agencies . . . . [P]oor families 
lead more public lives than their middle-class counterparts: rather than visiting private doctors, 
poor families are likely to attend public clinics and emergency rooms for routine medical care; 
rather than hiring contractors to fix their homes, poor families encounter public building 
inspectors; rather than using their cars to run errands, poor mothers use public transportation. 
Id. at 584. It is because of the increased frequency of contact with the state and its agents that they 
find themselves under state surveillance at higher rates than wealthier counterparts. The assumption 
is that if wealthier parents had to depend on the state and the services it provides as often as do the 
poor, their parenting would be observed, and problematized, more frequently. 
93. See Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 92, at 584 n.35; Kindred, supra note 89, at 533 
(“[F]amily problems of the indigent come to the attention of child welfare agencies at a 
disproportionate rate . . . . State protective agencies routinely rely on neglect statutes to remove 
children from the homes of parents who are too poor to support them.”); Roberts, supra note 24, at 
269 n.257. 
94. Bailey, Kandaswamy & Richardson, supra note 85, at 115. 
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racist . . . practices through which Child Protection Services 
determines who is fit or unfit to be a parent.95 
It is not at all unreasonable to assume that if these critics of the 
movement for marriage equality conceptualize expending resources to 
fight for marriage equality as an inessential extravagance, they would 
conceptualize any attention given to problematizing prohibitions against 
surrogacy as an even more lavish exercise in indulgence. They would 
likely argue that it is simply indulgent to fight for the ability to 
commission a surrogate’s services when the vulnerable sexual minorities 
who are the focus of these critics’ activism are struggling to provide 
basic necessities for themselves and their families. They would argue 
that it is entirely indulgent to fight for legalized surrogacy markets when 
the most marginalized sexual minorities are struggling for recognition.96 
Additionally, these critics would likely be concerned about what 
legalized surrogacy markets would mean for more marginalized sexual 
minorities. There is a reasonable fear that, if surrogacy became more 
widespread, families whose children do not share a genetic relationship 
with at least one of the parents would be perceived as less “family-like” 
than families in which there is a genetic bond between parent and 
child.97 That is, if surrogacy became more widespread, wealthier same-
sex couples could rely on surrogacy and become parents to genetically 
related children, while poorer couples would have to depend on the 
adoption of genetically unrelated children in order to become parents. 
The former families would mimic in important ways families headed by 
different-sex parents inasmuch as their children would share genetic 
bonds with the parents, whereas the latter families would not feature 
95. Id. These same-sex families of color do not exist in theory alone. One study shows that thirty-
four percent of black same-sex couples are raising children, amounting to approximately 20,000 
families. See ANGELIKI KASTANIS & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT AFRICAN-
AMERICANS AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN SAME-SEX COUPLES 2 (2013). 
96. See, e.g., Bailey, Kandaswamy & Richardson, supra note 85, at 119 (“[W]e live in bodies that 
are not exclusively ‘male’ or ‘female.’ Many of our genders and the genders of our lovers are not 
recognized by the state at all.”). 
97. The significance of the genetic tie is variable; it might be privileged or unprivileged, as 
needed, in order to protect the patriarchal nuclear family or to preserve racial hierarchies. See 
Roberts, supra note 24, at 252 (examining “the shifting significance of genetic connections in 
various disputes over legal parentage” and arguing that the examination “reveals more clearly than 
any other exercise the social and historical indeterminacy of this biological fact”). Accordingly, we 
should expect that families in which there is a genetic bond between parent and child would only be 
privileged if the privileging preserves gender and racial hierarchies. As such, if the same-sex 
couples that use surrogacy to produce genetically related children are white, then we might expect 
the genetic tie to be privileged, as its privileging would facilitate the privileging of a family form 
common among white people. 
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genetic connections between parents and children. The latter families, 
headed by same-sex parents who do not have the means to participate in 
legalized surrogacy markets, may be perceived as the less legitimate 
versions of their class-privileged counterparts.98 They may be treated as 
such within law. 
Even in our legal present, where surrogacy is illegal in several 
jurisdictions and extremely constrained in others, the families that same-
sex couples without privilege create are not treated as deserving of the 
same respect as are other families. Indeed, some activists have put forth 
the call to sexual minorities to “organize to have non-biological ties to 
children recognized and respected.”99 If non-biological ties to the 
children that sexual minorities have formally and informally adopted are 
going unrecognized and disrespected in a legal terrain where it is 
challenging for same-sex couples to produce biologically related 
children, there is reason to fear that those non-biological ties will be 
denigrated even further in a legal terrain where those with the means can 
more easily access and purchase biological ties to children. If dominant 
discourses already construct families headed by same-sex couples as 
inferior when children are genetically unrelated to their parents,100 what 
will happen to them—discursively and materially—when more same-sex 
98. Analogous to this concern is the concern raised by many within the LGBT civil rights 
movement that the legalization of same-sex marriage will result in the delegitimizing of nonmarital 
relationships between people. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 273 (noting the fear that “pursuing 
same-sex marriage would necessitate ‘perpetuating the elevation of married relationships’” (quoting 
Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK: NAT’L GAY & 
LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in William B. Rubenstein, Carlos B. Ball & Jane S. Schacter, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 695 (4th ed. 2011)); JUAN 
BATTLE ET AL., supra note 85, at 29 (observing that some LGBT persons “worry that condoning 
marriage will lead to greater exclusion of those who choose not to marry or choose to engage in 
nonnormative relationships and sexual exchanges”). This fear has borne out in practice, as many 
proponents of marriage equality have disparaged the institution of domestic partnerships and other 
institutions of nonmarital relationships established by the state in order to make the argument that 
marriage is singular and LGBT persons ought to have access to it. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 
259 (“In order to promote marriage equality, supporters have been utilizing tactics that involve 
touting marriage as a superior relationship status and disparaging nonmarital relationship statuses as 
inadequate, inferior, and discriminatory substitutes for marriage.”). Moreover, jurisdictions have 
repealed or narrowed statutes recognizing domestic partnerships and other avenues of nonmarital 
relationship recognition when they have amended their laws to recognize same-sex marriages. Id. 
99. Bailey, Kandaswamy & Richardson, supra note 85, at 115. 
100. See id. at 118–19 (noting that the families composed of sexual minorities of color tend to be 
“more ‘queer’ than simply having two parents and children; we have kids enter our lives from our 
extended families, from our neighbors and friends” and suggesting that the veneration of same-sex 
couples who have families that approximate in structure those of different-sex couples “do[es] 
violence to the numerous forms of intimate arrangements and loving parenting that do not conform 
to mainstream ideas”).   
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couples can form genetically related families that mimic heterosexual 
norms? There may be little reason for optimism. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to demonstrate that surrogacy may 
function to exacerbate the marginalization of families that are already 
quite marginalized as well as reaffirm extant racial hierarchies in this 
country. Accordingly, we have excellent reasons for opposing the 
practice. 
However, there may be more effective ways of disrupting racial and 
other social hierarchies than simply banning surrogacy. Indeed, a ban on 
surrogacy may do little to interrupt the macro processes by which racial 
inequality is reproduced. Accordingly, this Article does not take the 
“easy way out” by calling for a prohibition on surrogacy. Instead, it 
argues that if social justice is to be realized in this country, we must do 
difficult, truly transformational work. Prohibiting surrogacy seems like a 
quick fix that likely will fix nothing. 
Part of the difficult, transformational work that will produce real 
social justice consists of supporting families headed by same-sex 
couples, as well as families headed by different-sex couples, within 
which parents and children do not share a genetic relationship. With this 
in mind, it is well documented that the genetic tie is not quite as 
venerated among many black people in the United States.101 For many 
African Americans, blood relationships do not necessarily create 
families.102 Much more important than genetics is love. We ought to 
look to these communities for models of alternative family forms within 
which genetics is not the tie that binds. More importantly, we ought to 
do the difficult cultural work of unsettling the discourses that construct 
these families as the inferior version of “real” families that are united by 
blood.103 We need to create counternarratives about what constitutes 
“good” and “bad” families. Equally important, we need to support 
nontraditional families wherein biology does not unite parents with 
101. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 24, at 230–31 (“The genetic tie has a different meaning for 
most Black people than for most whites . . . . Black cultural definitions of group and self center less 
on the genetic tie than white cultural definitions do.”).  
102. See id. at 269 (“Blood ties have not held the preeminent position in Black families that they 
have held in white families. Blacks’ incorporation of extended kin and nonkin relationships into the 
notion of ‘family’ goes back at least to slavery.”). 
103. See, e.g., id. at 271–72 (stating that the “genetic tie is not a glorified prerequisite for 
inclusion in the Black family” and noting that families in which members are not genetic kin may 
challenge “the dominant conceptions of kinship bonds”). 
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children once they are created. And we need to facilitate the creation of 
these families. 
In this vein, we should put at the center of our crosshairs laws and 
policies that make it difficult or impossible for same-sex couples to 
foster or to adopt children.104 Such laws and policies include those that 
effectively ban same-sex couples from adopting children,105 that prevent 
same-sex couples from acting as foster parents,106 and that prioritize 
different-sex married couples when placing children in state custody in 
foster homes.107 If, as this Article has suggested, Windsor declares the 
legitimacy of families headed by individuals of the same-sex, then the 
decision should be understood as calling into question the legitimacy of 
these types of policies as stridently as it calls into question prohibitions 
on compensated surrogacy. 
There is other difficult work to be done as well. But, this seems like a 
fair place to start inasmuch as it does not involve limiting opportunities 
for the privileged, but rather expanding opportunities for the 
unprivileged. 
 
104. It is worth noting that challenges to these laws are also challenges to systems that reiterate 
racial inequality in this country. There are two reasons for this. First, black children are 
overrepresented in the foster care system. Id. at 269 n.257. Accordingly, laws that make it difficult 
for foster children to be placed in loving, permanent homes mean that more black children will 
suffer the ill effects of being institutionalized during their formative years. Stacy Robinson, 
Comment, Remedying Our Foster Care System: Recognizing Children’s Voices, 27 FAM. L.Q. 395, 
397 (1993) (“This country is presently in the midst of a foster care crisis. The foster care system is 
ravaged by problems, including increasing numbers of children in the system, large case loads for 
caseworkers, inadequate funding of social services and foster care, and ineffective representation of 
the children in the system.”). Second, there are indications that parenting is more common among 
black lesbians as compared to other racial groups. See JUAN BATTLE ET AL., supra note 85, at 15 
(observing that “parenting is somewhat more prevalent among Black lesbians than among White 
lesbians”). As such, laws that make it difficult or impossible for same-sex couples to adopt or to 
foster children function to disproportionately burden black people. See id. (noting that “anti-gay 
parenting policies may pose a particular threat to Black lesbians or would-be parents”). 
105. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.), invalidated by 
Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. In re Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Regular First & Second 
Extraordinary Sess.).  
106. Administrative Memorandum – Human Services – #1-95 from Mary Dean Harvey, Director 
Neb. Dep’t of Social Servs., Placement in Foster Care (Jan. 23, 1995), available at 
http://dhhs.ne.gov/children_family_services/Documents/AM-1.pdf.   
107. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102(4) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Gen. Sess.). 
 
                                                     
